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Jurisprudence Is Practical
Reginald Parker
M OST PRACTICING LAWYERS and even some law teachers still regard
jurisprudence as a "fancy" subject that has a "mere cultural" value. Now,
I for one would not belittle "cultural" subjects, such as Latin or history,
and if there is anything by which the cultural level of American college
graduates in general and lawyers in particular can be raised, I will sup-
port it. As to fanciness - who knows what is "fancy" and what is "practi-
cal"? Copyright law or admiralty becomes eminently practical as soon
as a case touching upon those matters comes along. I, for instance, earned
one of my largest fees be-
cause I was versed in
THE AuTHOR (LL.B. and J.D., 1927, Univer- Canon Law and thus could
sity of Vienna) was born in Phoenicia, New help a couple who had
York. He is Professor of Law at Willamette
University. been turned down by five
other lawyers whose knowl-
edge did not include this
"fancy" subject. More power to both fanciful and cultural pursuits! It is,
however, the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that jurisprudence
should be studied not because of its undeniable cultural value nor because
it is a bit out of the way and hence thought to be "fancy," but rather be-
cause it is eminently useful and of practical value.
Iuris prudentia in Latin means what it still means in German,' where
Jurisprudenz is used as the older word for Rechtwissenschaft: the sum
total of law as a taught discipline. To study Jurisprudenz in those lan-
guages means simply to study law. The French usage differs. In that
language la jurisprudence is what we might call the trend of decisions,
as distinguished from la doctrine, which is the prevailing opinion or
theory on a point of law among professors and legal writers. Some older
English writers have used the word jurisprudence in the French sense, as
do Louisiana decisions and writers, somewhat unnecessarily it seems. In
modern common English usage, however, jurisprudence can be defined
as the science of the law, the science that explains the nature and purpose
of any legal order 2
'Admittedly, the Romans were a bit vague about the nature of the legal science.
See, e.g., luris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum votitia, iusti atque iniust
scientia ("Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine, the science of the just and
the unjust.") Institutiones 1, 1, 1.
2W. W. Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence 1-5 (1945), gives a good
critique of the term jurisprudence, which contrasts with legal philosophy.
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It is not easily conceivable that a physician or astronomer should be
ignorant as to what their respective sciences are concerned with. Law-
yers, on the other hand, are rarely able to define or even explain what
their science is about. This, however, is due not to a greater degree of
uneducatedness on the part of lawyers but rather to an innate difference
between physical and speculative, especially normative, sciences. Physi-
cists, astronomers and doctors deal with causal problems, that is, with the
description and investigation of events as they follow, or seem to follow,
from one another. A doctor may therefore quite easily refer to medicine
as the science that studies the functions and propensities of the human
body, of diseases and their causes and their cures, i.e., of facts and reali-
ties. And the astronomer thinks of his science as dealing with the com-
position, motion and other characteristics of celestial phenomena. All
natural scientists deal with realities, with the world of cause and effect.
If he had never heard of a definition of his science, the natural scientist
could make it up at any time with no particular mental effort.
But what is law? We know that it "must" be "applied" or "enforced,"
but this recognition amounts to a mere vague statement and does not en-
lighten us as to the nature of the law. The scientist deals with causal
laws-"when A is present, B will result." The sum total of such laws make
up his particular discipline. Lawyers at times express themselves simi-
larly- "when a person steals, he will be jailed" - but this is patently
incorrect, for if it would causally follow that anybody who steals will be
incarcerated, we would need no law forbidding theft! Yet the frequent
confusion between causal "laws" and the norms that concern the lawyer
have greatly contributed to the creation of the natural-law myth.3 In
short, we are dealing with a legal, or normative, order whose essence can
be reduced to the statement, "When there is A, there ought to be (or
'shall' be) B." Law does not connect facts causally but normatively. If a
so-called causal law "fails to work," the law must of necessity be wrong,
or inaccurately stated in some respect. Thus the law of gravity is said to
affect bodies regardless of their weight. But everybody knows that under
normal circumstances a stone falls with greater speed to the ground than,
say, a feather. This is due to air resistance, which means that gravity
produces the effects ascribed to it only in a vacuum and must be amended,
as it were, if one wishes to speak of falling objects in a space that is
filled with air.
A law in the lawyer's sense-a norm-on the other hand, cannot
so easily be analyzed. It is valid quite regardless of its effect. A recent
report in the New York Times told its readers that 85% of the thefts in
'The typical natural lawyer believes that there "exists," as a reality, a perfect, uni-
versally valid legal order that can and ought to be "found" like a corporeal object.
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New York City go unpunished; yet who would deny that theft is "against
the law" in New York! In other words, law is "valid" even though it
may not be very efficacious, an assertion which of course would be non-
sensical if made of a physical, i.e., a causal, law. This bit of mental gym-
nastics is quite necessary if one seeks to ascertain the nature of the legal
order, a task with which every lawyer should confront himself at some
stage of his career, either in law school or in practice. A good school,
indeed, will not fail to offer jurisprudence, that is, a course concerning
itself with the legal order itself.
To arrive at a list of the essential characteristics of the legal order,
then, is one of our goals. Our statement that it is a normative or "ought"
system does not exhaust the matter, for there are other systems which
fit that description such as religion, morals, ethics, and even etiquette.
Some of them can be distinguished from the legal order by their lack
of coercive force, but that is a somewhat tenuous distinction. Actually,
the compulsion inherent in the ethical or moral order is social contempt,
although it might be argued that the moral order of some people (ideal
Puritans, for example, if there ever were such men) exists only in their
own conscience. A better distinction might be the lack of centralization
in the non-legal norms; yet some religions are highly centralized. We
will therefore recognize as the most valid distinction the fact that the
legal order emanates from, and indeed is identical with, the state.
At this stage of the study of jurisprudence the practical-minded law-
yer and law student have already gained an advantage over those who
have only blurred notions of their own field of activity: he has a de-
tached and logically trained view of the law. He can unmask empty
phrases. He can, for instance, reduce the often-heard maxim of the "gov-
ernment of law and not of men" to its proper size and meaning, viz., "a
government of ascertainable, detailed, pre-existing law and not of men
who have authority to create new law ad hoc." For if law and state are
one, and if the government is the representative of the state, there can be
no government that is not "of law." Ours is a government of law, as was
that of Hitler. He acted pursuant to the supreme German law that gave
the Nazi party and especially Hider "all power," i.e., authority to make
any law. But it was not civilized, decent law that so authorized him.
The student of jurisprudence has no difficulty in perceiving the prob-
lem that existed before and was put to some test by the Steel Seizure
case: 4 whether the President has "inherent" emergency powers, such as
would enable him to seize property for the sake of the common weal.
The student knows, first, that the preferable expression for "power" (a
word more appropriately used to describe the physical, causal world) is
'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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"authority." He knows, further, that any authority of a state organ, such
as the President, is necessarily a legal authority. And, finally, the student
knows that this is another way of saying that his authority must be based
on some law. There was no such written emergency law or constitution-
al provision. Hence, "the recognition of a presidential authority so far-
reaching as to include the power to change the law would be synonymous
with recognition of a second, unwritten, constitution conferring undeter-
mined authorities upon the Chief Executive." 5  This, fortunately, the
Supreme Court refused to do.
Discussions such as these lead to the very useful recognition of the
fact that law-and every legal authority-must be based on law to be
valid. Any legal norm derives its validity from some other, "higher"
legal norm. If a state board issues a regulation, this is valid only because
some state statute so authorizes. The state statute is valid because it is
authorized by the state constitution; and the state constitution is valid only
if it is authorized by, i.e., does not contravene, the Federal Constitution.
On what norm, then, is the Constitution based? Depending on the
speaker's political conviction, he may choose one of two answers. He may
say that the Constitution is based on international law in that interna-
tional law has recognized the United States, and hence its Constitution,
as a member of the international legal order. This answer means that all
national law goes ultimately back to international law. It can be argued
that our Constitution supports this view.' Or he may say that the Con-
stitution's validity stems from the norm-creating force of a successful
revolution (or conquest, as in the case of, e.g., England in 1066). Un-
der this view, international law does not truly exist as a supra-national
body of law but is valid only insofar as it is recognized by the national
legal order. And, indeed, this argument, too, can be supported by the
wording of the above cited constitutional provision! 7 In short, one may
say either that it is only through the Constitution that we recognize in-
ternational law or that it is only through international law that our Con-
stitution validly exists. Logically, there is no "correct" answer. It is a
matter of choice. But the recognition and correct formulation of this and
related problems would have saved many a newspaper- and magazine-
reader from mountains of printed nonsense in connection with that mod-
ern revolution-created state, communist China. The legal problem is
simpler than all the articles and after-dinner speeches would make it ap-
pear.
5 REGINALD PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, A TEXT 86 (1952).
'"... all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby .. " U.S. Const. Art. VI.
7 Ibid.
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Logical clarity in general and the recognition in particular that law
must be based on law sharpen the critic's eye in reading a decision. Take
Petnoyer v. Neff.8 To satisfy himself for a debt for legal services a man
seized another man's property in a manner quite proper under the laws,
and with the help of the courts, of Oregon. The former debtor later sued
him to recover the land and succeeded in the Supreme Court of the
United States. But the creditor's action was perfectly lawful- the courts
of Oregon said that they had jurisdiction over the seized property and
upheld the procedure that was followed. (Suppose the incident had hap-
pened in Portugal, involving property situated there. Could then our
Supreme Court have declared "illegal for want of jurisdiction" what was
in fact legal because based on jurisdiction under the laws of Portugal?)
Toward the end of its lengthy opinion, which is otherwise a good disser-
tation on "jurisdiction quasi in rem," the Court seemed to recognize the
necessity that, however much it might frown on this or that kind of pro-
cedure, to set them aside there must be authority in law. The legal
ground for its action then is presented by the Court: the fourteenth
amendment; which, by decreeing that property may be taken only pur-
suant to due process of law, implicitly provided that a state must have
jurisdiction in an objective sense -that is, actually, in the sense in which
the Supreme Court will interpret "jurisdiction" - before it can proceed
against a person. Oregon did not have jurisdiction, ergo its proceedings
were invalid. So far, so good; but the complained-of proceedings took
place in February 1866, i., before the Fourteenth Amendment was en-
acted!' The Supreme Court was silent on this point. Its decision means
that the amendment has retroactive force, which in turn would mean
that every ex-slave could have sued for damages, for was he not deprived,
through state law now invalid, of his liberty and property prior to the
amendment? The Supreme Court may of course have based later deci-
sions on this rationale, but in fact Pennoyer v. Neff has not become a
precedent to the effect that the fourteenth amendment has retroactive
force. I have the feeling that if the defendant's lawyer in that venerable
landmark had been a good jurisprudence scholar, he would have demon-
strated the far-reaching, undesirable result of the plaintiff's position and
would have won the case.
In touching upon the problem of this or that interpretation of statu-
tory or case law, the student of course realizes that many laws are am-
biguous and that it is the task of the law applier to "find," as it usually
is called, the "correct" construction. Yet if there is a construction that is
895 U.S. 714 (1878).
'The amendment was proposed by Congress on June 13, 1866. Ratification was
completed two years later.
1955]
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correct then the law is not ambiguous, and if it is ambiguous no one in-
terpretation is more correct than the other. What the law-applier- legis-
lator under a constitution, judge under a statute or the common law, etc.
-really does, is to make a choice under the guise of "finding" law. His
choice may rightly be called a political or policy choice, and it differs
quite categorically from the ordinary law-applier's task of interpreting
the law. The practical inportance of this distinction lies in the fact that
it enables us to recognize a great many so-called truths as mere subjec-
tive opinions, not of what is correct, but of what is desirable to the judge
or lawmaker. In other words, as long as the commerce dause is as am-
biguous as it is, it will be up to the law-appliers and ultimately the Su-
preme Court to say what may be included in federal control under this
clause. But the jurisprudence student knows that, while some of these
interpretations may sound more desirable to him, none is more "correct"
than the other.10 I can think hardly of anything more practical.11
Members of the jurisprudence guild will no doubt have identified me
as a follower of Hans Kelsen.' 2 I have found his clear, logical way of ex-
amining the essential propensities of the legal order and of divorcing it
methodically from politics (thereby not at all belittling the lawyer's po-
litical task and hence the necessity for his political education! 13 ) as the
one best suited for the purpose of instructing students as to what the law
is. This, however, must not mean that a jurisprudence teacher should
not pay attention to the great schools of jurisprudence and legal philoso-
phy, notably the natural law school to which American political thinking
owes so much; the historical school, which between Savigny and Spengler
has reduced if not shattered man's belief in a universally valid harmonious
order; and the modern sociologists who, though constantly confusing the
"is" (man's actual behavior) with the "ought" (normative orders), have
rendered inestimable contributions to the clarification of such problems
as the purpose of the law and what its enforcement actually accomplishes.
1 0 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HIsToRY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) to the contrary notwithstanding. But see Brown
and Hart, book review, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1954).
Nobody will deny the practical value of mathematics despite the fact that it deals
with abstract figures and concepts rather than with concrete objects and commodities.
Especially recommended to jurisprudence students are his GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE (1945); Science and Politics, 45 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 641 (1951),
a masterpiece that should be read by every lawyer and political scientist; THE LAW
OF THE UNITED NATIONs xiii-xvii (1950) (preface "On Interpretation").
"Hans Kelsen is the author of the Austrian constitution and was once a Permanent
Judge in the Austrian Constitutional Court. In both these capacities, as well as an
adviser to the American Government and to United Nations delegations, he has had
more political experience than any American professor I can think of, now that
Bruening has returned to Germany.
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This returns us to what we have said about choosing (in a civilized
society) one out of several possible interpretations of law. It is not
done merely to satisfy one's own predilections but rather is, or, should be,
guided by the ethical standards of a free country. As we have said, this
is not a legal question, to be sure, but it is of eternal importance to all
law interpreters, statesmen and lawyers alike. The jurisprudence teacher
may well find it worth while to digress from his foremost task-to
analyze the law and legal order -not in order to indoctrinate hIs students,
but to get to the core of the law-applier's most serious problem which is
not so much the question whether this or that form of government war-
rants a freer society than any other, whether we or they are free or slaves,
but rather whether man wants to be free. I can think of no better discus-
sion than the one in Dostoyevski's Grand Inquisitor.14 In this unexcelled
jewel of a novelette, the anti-Christ demonstrates, not inaptly I must con-
fess, that man wants and at the same tme does not want to be free. He
is too weak to be allowed to be free and forge his own destiny and too
freedom-loving to admit that he prefers to be a slave. To keep him
happy, his leaders must keep man in bondage while telling him that he is
truly free. "With us all will be happy and we will not more rebel and
destroy one another we shall persuade them that they will only be-
come free when they renounce their freedom to us and submit to us."
Who can deny that Dostoyevski's modern compatriots are doing just that
-telling their people that they live in a "people's democracy"? To dis-
cuss and, if possible, refute the Grand Inquisitor's political theory is in-
deed a task supreme for any teacher.
" In Book V, Chapter 5 of the Brothers Karamazov.
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